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Credit Market Freedom and Cost Efficiency  
in US state banking 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the dynamics between the credit market freedom counterparts of the economic 
freedom index drawn from the Fraser institute database and bank cost efficiency levels across the U.S. 
states. We consider a sample of 3,809 commercial banks per year, on average, over the period 1987-
2012. After estimating cost efficiency scores using the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), we develop a 
fractional regression model to test the implications of financial freedom for bank efficiency. Our results 
indicate that banks operating in states that enjoy a higher degree of economic freedom are more cost 
efficient. Greater independence in financial and banking markets from government controls can result 
in higher bank efficiency. This effect emerges in addition to the efficiency enhancing effects of interstate 
banking and intrastate branching deregulation.  
 
 
JEL classification: C1; G01; G21; G28 
Keywords: Economic freedom indices; Credit market freedom; Bank cost efficiency; Data 
Envelopment Analysis 
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1. Introduction 
Over the recent decades the banking system in the United States (U.S.) went through many 
phases characterized by various levels or regulatory intensity. In the early 1980s financial intermediation 
took place in the presence of the Glass-Steagall Act, regulation Q, and restrictions on branching and 
interstate banking activities. A process of interstate banking deregulation was completed by mid 1990s, 
although adaptation to the Riegle-Neal act was slow.1 The ensuing wave of consolidation increased the 
average bank size and allowed banks to expand into new markets by operating larger branch networks 
or bank holding companies. Moreover, by 1999 the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act repealed key provisions of 
the Glass-Steagall Act regarding the affiliation between banks and securities firms. The financial and 
economic crisis of 2007-2008 was followed by financial regulatory reform spearheaded by the Dodd-
Frank Act. Nevertheless banking regulation across the U.S. states remains highly fractionalized to date 
(Bernanke, 2015). 
A growing literature exists assessing the effects of various forms of banking regulation (e.g., 
capital regulation, supervision, activity restrictions, etc.) on the efficiency of financial institutions.2 As 
Barth et al. (2013) observe, however, the limited data availability on concrete measures of various bank 
regulations impedes the achievement of a comprehensive analysis on bank regulation and oversight. 
Various types of data exists attempting to measure the degree and tightness of restrictions on financial 
institutions’ activities. La Porta et al. (1998; 2000), for example, consider financial liberalization, while 
Barth et al. (2006) and Barth et al. (2013) produce detailed data on bank regulation, supervision and 
monitoring for a large number of countries. A limited but developing literature uses the financial 
counterparts of the indices that measure economic freedom either as control variables in bank 
                                                          
1 See Berger and DeYoung (2001). 
2 See Barth et al. (2006) for a literature survey. 
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performance analyses (e.g., Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2004; Chortareas et al., 2011) or as key determinants 
of bank efficiency (Giannone et al., 2011). Recent empirical evidence by Chortareas et al. (2013) indicate 
that excessive government interference in the financial institutions activities, as reflected in low scores 
of the financial freedom indices, exert a negative impact on bank efficiency. heir results also suggest 
that banks operating in countries characterized by good governance and policies that promote financial 
freedom may result in a more efficient resource allocation process and a more effective management. 
The analysis is based on a sample of banks operating in 27 European Union (EU) countries from 2001 to 
2009 (6,744 observations). Yet, the recent global financial crisis has put the discussion regarding 
governments’ interference in the financial system on a new basis. 
Abundant evidence exists on the efficiency of U.S. banks. Part of this literature analyses the 
effects of bank integration within the U.S. as well as of branching and intrastate banking deregulation on 
bank efficiency (e.g., Berger and DeYoung, 2001; Morgan et. al., 2004 Jeon and Miller, 2007; Zou et. al., 
2011). To our knowledge, however, no evidence exists on how the degree of a state's financial freedom, 
typically measured by “freedom indices”, may affect bank efficiency. This paper explicitly considers how 
the tightness of the regulatory environment, as captured by the financial freedom indices may affect 
bank performance. To proxy the regulatory environment we use the indices of freedom for the U.S. 
states, constructed by the Fraser Institute, focusing on the financial counterparts of the freedom indices. 
In particular, we consider the credit market freedom index, which measures the degree of financial and 
banking markets’ independence from government control. Moreover, we account for the effects of 
other freedom indices, capturing related dimensions, whose effects may complement those of the credit 
market freedom index. In testing the above hypothesis we use bank specific, deregulation, and crises 
controls.  
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Key pieces of long-lasting banking regulation in the U.S. have been introduced in the mid-war 
period. The McFadden Act of 1927 imposed branching and geographic restrictions on nationally 
chartered banks to protect small banks from "destructive competition". National banks had to operate 
within their home state and also faced restrictions on their intrastate branching. The extent of state-
wide branching allowed differed from state to state. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 in addition to 
separating commercial and investment banking and imposing interest rate regulations, amended the 
McFadden Act to further restrict interstate banking. Banks responded to the regulatory restrictions by 
creating bank-holding companies, "non-bank banks", and "non-bank-offices". The Bank Holding 
Company Act of 1956 made illegal the bank branching via bank acquisition by bank holding companies. 
Some restrictions were relaxed since the 1970s, a number of New England states allowed interstate 
branching in the 1980s, and in general a process of deregulation on a state-by-state basis occurred 
during this period. The most decisive step in terms of geographical restrictions removal was taken by 
the passage of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) of 1994.3  
The rationale for the hypothesized relationship between financial freedom measures and bank 
performance emanates from basic tenets of economic theory: the freer financial institutions are from 
various restrictions in pursuing their business the more efficiently they will organize their operations in 
order to minimize costs/maximize profits (Chortareas et. al., 2013). We focus on the concept of cost 
efficiency, which is typically the focus of efficiency analysis studies. Moreover, in the aftermath of the 
global financial crisis achieving high levels of efficiency on the cost side has become a critical factor for 
the ability of financial institutions to compete and survive. 
We obtain efficiency scores for banks operating in the U.S. using Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) over the period 1987-2012, utilizing a large and unique sample of 99,032 commercial bank 
                                                          
3 For more details and the specific effects of the IBBEA on bank efficiency see Zou et al., (2011); and Jeon and 
Miller (2007). 
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observations. We then regress the efficiency estimates on the economic freedom indices and their 
financial counterparts employing the Papke and Wooldridge’s (1996) ‘fractional logit’ estimator. Our 
analysis controls for bank-specific variables including capitalization, the relative size of the institutions, 
the quality of bank loans, and a proxy for off-balance-sheet (OBS) activities exposure. In addition, we 
consider other deregulator indicators and crises dummies to account for environmental changes and for 
robustness purposes. An extensive literature on bank efficiency exists.4 The ability of financial 
institutions to remain efficient is vital for their very existence, the ability to deliver services to 
consumers, and the financial system’s stability. The more efficient financial institutions are, the higher 
the level of expected profitability and service quality for consumers. In addition, if the efficiency savings 
are directed towards improving capital buffers that absorb risk one would expect a higher degree of 
safety and soundness for the financial system as a whole.  
Our results indicate that there is a strong link between credit market freedom and bank cost 
efficiency. In particular, the higher the degree of a state's credit market freedom, the better the banks’ 
performance is in terms cost efficiency. The evidence also suggests that the deregulation process that 
took place during the 80s and 90s has improved the efficient operation of banks, with the efficiency 
gains being more pronounced in states with freer market systems.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the data and empirical 
methodology, Section 3 discusses the empirical results, and Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Data and methodology  
 
                                                          
4 For comprehensive survey see Berger (2007); Goddard et al. (2010); Hughes and Mester (2010). 
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2.1. Data sources 
To construct our data set we take balance sheet data of commercial banks from the quarterly 
Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income filed by commercial banks, known as “Call Repots”. Call 
reports are prepared at the level of bank, with each commercial bank uniquely identified by the report 
item RSSD9001. We focus on commercial banks operating in the 48 states5 of the U.S. over the period 
1987-2012.6 Given that the DEA efficiency measures can be sensitive to the presence of outliers and 
data errors, we run the data through a substantial screening and editing process as suggested by Berger 
and Mester (1997) in order to assure a high degree of credibility for the emerging efficiency indices 
(“super-efficient” observations). Implementing such screening methods, results in an unbalanced panel 
of 99,032 observations.  
 The time and size distributions of banks included in the estimation of the efficiency frontier are 
shown in Table 1. As illustrated in Table 1 an average of 3,809 U.S. bank observations per year is used 
for the frontier estimations. Although the asset size values have been seemingly risen on average during 
the period considered, after 2009 and again after the debt crisis in Europe in 2011, have declined 
dramatically, showing how the recent global financial crisis led to a noticeable fall in bank asset size. 
 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
 
 We use the economic freedom of North America indices by state as constructed by the Fraser 
Institute (2014) database. There exist two major attempts to measure economic freedom producing the 
                                                          
5 Arizona and Rhode Island states are excluded from our sample due to lack of data in the estimation of the frontier.  
6  Data on Call Reports after 2010 are obtained from FFIEC (Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council) 
Central Data Repository's Public Data Distribution web site.   
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corresponding indexes, namely the Economic Freedom of North America Annual Reports produced by 
the Fraser Institute and the Index of Economic Freedom created by the Heritage Foundation and the 
Wall Street Journal. Both indexes are highly credible and their results are compatible in general (e.g. De 
Haan & Sturm, 2000; Chortareas et al., 2013). In this paper we use the Economic Freedom of North 
America which is the only comprehensive economic freedom database that presents the ratings for U.S. 
by state.7 In particular, we focus on the “credit market regulation” component counterparts of the 
economic freedom index, which captures the degree of regulatory tightness in finance. The variables of 
economic freedom range from 0, for “no freedom”, to 10 for “maximum freedom”. In order to capture 
the broader regulatory environment within which economic activity takes place, we also consider the 
other two sub-components of the “regulation” counterpart of the freedom index, namely “labor 
regulation” and “business regulation”. We discuss these “regulation” variables and we provide detailed 
information on the economic freedom variables used in our empirical analysis in Appendix B (Table B.1). 
 
2.2. Estimating cost efficiency: the DEA approach 
To examine the impact of economic and credit market freedom on bank efficiency, we use a 
two-stage approach. The first stage consists in deriving DEA cost efficiency scores for the banks in our 
sample. In the second stage we regress the cost efficiency scores against the available indices of 
economic freedom, as well as on a set of bank specific and deregulation control variables.  
DEA employs a linear programming framework and, by making some fairly general assumptions 
about the underlying production technology, yields an estimate of the Farrell’s (1957) efficiency 
measure for each bank in the sample. This paper uses the input-oriented DEA with Variable Returns to 
                                                          
7 Another index of economic freedom across the US states is that provided by the Mercatus Center but the economic 
freedom counterpart of this index is a synthetic index of “fiscal policy” and “regulatory policy” where the last does 
not cover the financial sector. 
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Scale (VRS) which allows the production technology of banks in the sample to exhibit increasing, 
constant, or decreasing returns to scale.8 This translates into the following cost-minimization model 
being solved n  times; each time for a different bank in the sample: 
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where,    is a 1N vector of constraints, X  and Y  are the nm  input and ns  output 
matrices respectively, nj ,...1  represents the number of banks, mi ,...,1  are input volumes used by 
bank j , sr ,...,1  measures the volume of output r , and 0ic  is the unit cost of input i  for 0bank  
which is the benchmark projection that can be different from one bank to another. Based on the 
optimal solution of the above problem *)*,( x , we define the cost efficiency of bank j  as: 
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*
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                   (1b)
 
                                                          
8 The first version of DEA assumes Constant Returns to Scale (CRS), i.e. a change in inputs is followed by a change 
in the same proportion of the outputs (Charnes et al., 1978). 
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The relative cost efficiency measure jCE  emerges as a ratio of the estimated minimum cost 
bank j could potentially achieve to its realized cost, where 10  jCE   and equals unity when the bank 
is deemed cost-efficient. 
Banks’ cost efficiencies are measured relative to a common frontier by pooling the data across 
states estimated separately for each year. This approach allows us to estimate efficiency differentials 
not only between commercial banks within a state but across states as well using the same benchmark. 
That is we adopt the “intermediation approach” (Berger and Humphrey, 1997) which views banks as 
intermediaries that employ labor, capital, and deposits to produce different types of loan accounts.In 
order to estimate cost efficiency, we need to compute input prices. The price of labor is obtained by 
dividing salaries and employee benefits by the number of employees. The cost of physical capital is 
calculated as expenses on premises and fixed assets divided by premises and fixed assets. The price of 
deposits is derived as interest expenses divided by total deposits. Finally, to construct the output series 
we specify two variables that capture the traditional lending (consumer loans) and non-lending activities 
of banks (business loans-all other loans), as well as their non-traditional activities (total securities). 
Capturing the non-traditional activities of banks is essential given the increased involvement of 
commercial banks in fee generating items. We present the descriptive statistics for outputs, inputs and 
their respective prices in Table 2.  
 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
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2.3. Regression framework 
The second stage of our analysis, consists in uncovering, by means of regression methods, the 
underlying relationship between the estimated cost efficiency levels and the economic freedom indices 
while controlling for bank specific factors, deregulation and crises indicators. Specifically, we estimate 
the following equations:  
 
kiitkiiki REGIONYEARBHEFF ,43,21,                                             (2a) 
kiiiitkiiki CRISESDREGIONYEARBCREDITEFF ,6543,21,         (2b) 
      
where i  indexes state i , k  indexes bank k . The dependent variable kiEFF ,  is the managerial 
cost efficiency measure, measuring how far the bank is from the estimated efficient frontier. In other 
words, this is a relative measure, which implies that the best-practice banks are by definition one 
hundred per cent efficient, while the others are characterized as inefficient relative to them. The vector 
iH  contains the indicators of economic freedom in state i , kiB ,  is a vector of bank-specific 
characteristics for each bank k  in state i , and tYEAR  
is an annual dummy variable controlling inter alia 
for other macroeconomic and technical changes. iREGION  is a regional dummy
9 controlling for 
systematic differences across states (Clark, 1998), and 
ki,  is the error term.  
                                                          
9 Clark (1998) provides evidence that region-specific components are significant for the cyclical variation in the 
major regions of the U.S. The nine regions have been constructed based on the United States Census Bureau 
grouping which is the most commonly used classification system for large nations (such as the U.S.), with its diverse 
physical and cultural geography and its numerous State components. Appendix A, Table A.2 defines the nine census 
regions as described in the United States Census Bureau website. 
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Equation (2b) focuses more explicitly on the credit market freedom variable       ( iCREDIT ), 
which proxies for financial (banking) freedom, and introduces additional controls ( iD ) capturing the 
years states entered an interstate banking compact (interstate banking deregulation) and the years they 
permitted intrastate branching (intrastate branching deregulation), as constructed by Morgan et al. 
(2004)10. By doing so, we want to prevent our credit market freedom variable from capturing the effects 
of these regional deregulation indicators. Finally, we consider the impact of the savings and loans crisis 
and the recent financial crisis by introducing the dummy iCRISE .  
To estimate equations (2a) and (2b) we employ Papke and Wooldridge’s (1996) ‘fractional logit’ 
estimator. The reason for this choice is that DEA efficiency scores are not the outcome of a truncated 
process but rather the outcome of a fractional logit process and thus, not a latent variable (McDonald, 
2009). Therefore, Papke and Wooldridge’s (1996) quasi-likelihood estimator captures the nature of 
efficiency estimates which are generated by a fractional logit process. Since the DEA efficiency scores 
are bounded and typically lie between zero and one ( 10  jCE ), the fractional regression model 
appears more appropriate as it keeps the predicted values of the fractional response conditional mean 
in the unit interval. 
The vector Hi of equation 2a contains the variables accounting for economic freedom from the 
Fraser Institute’s (2014) database. Specifically, we define the vector Hi  as follows: 
 
),,,,,( iiiiiii TRADEPROPERTYSIZELABORBUSINESSCREDITH   
            (3) 
 
                                                          
10 Appendix A, Table A.1 provides details for the interstate and intrastate deregulation dates by state. 
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where, iCREDIT , is an indicator of credit regulation quality with larger values signifying more 
freedom. This variable incorporates considerations about ownership of banks, competition, extension of 
credit, and presence of interest rate controls. Other studies that use the international counterpart of 
this variable as a proxy of the regulatory quality in the finance industry include Giannone et. al. (2011) 
and Chortareas et, al. (2013). In order to control for all components of the regulatory quality, the vector 
Hi  also includes the sub-components pertaining to “business freedom” ( iBUSINESS ) and “labor 
freedom” ( iLABOR ). The “business freedom” variable is a proxy of the ability to establish and run a 
business without interference from the government. Burdensome and redundant regulatory rules are 
the most common barriers to the free conduct of business activities. Higher values of the “labor 
freedom” index reflect  a high degree of protection in the labor market with possible direct or indirect 
effects on the cost of labor inputs and therefore on the cost efficiency of the financial institutions. 
To capture a state’s broader environment within which economic activity takes place, the vector 
Hi also includes the following variables from the Fraser Institute: size of government, legal system and 
property rights, and freedom to trade internationally. The ( iSIZE ) variable receives a lower score as 
government expenditure and involvement in the economy grows. Higher values of the variable 
iPROPERTY  indicate a high degree of private property rights protection and the existence of a sound 
legal system. The Fraser Institute constructs a “world-adjusted” index that has each province’s and 
state’s score adjusted by data from the world index for the legal system and property rights. Finally, the 
freedom to trade internationally variable ( iTRADE ), is an aggregate measure of the ability of 
individuals to engage in voluntary exchange, which increases wealth for both buyer and seller. The 
economic freedom indicators take values in a scale from 0 to 10, where higher values indicate an 
economic environment or set of policies that is most conducive to economic freedom. 
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 The regression specifications in equations (2a) and (2b) account for bank-specific control 
variables ( kiB , ) while equation (2b) further includes state -specific deregulator control variables ( iD ) as 
a robustness check. The corresponding vectors are defined as follows: 
 
),,,,( ,,
2
,,,, kikikikikiki OBSTALQLNTALNTAEQASB    
           (4) 
),( iii INTRAINTERD             (5) 
 
In particular the vector kiB , , as specified  in equation (4), includes a set of bank-specific factors 
that might influence the efficiency of a particular bank included in the second-stage regression model. 
We consider all the bank-specific variables, which one usually encounters in efficiency analyses, namely: 
(i) the equity over total assets ratio (
kiEQAS , ), which proxies the level of capitalization; (ii) the bank size, 
defined as the logarithm of the bank’s total assets ( kiLNTA , ); (iii) the quadratic term  ( kiLNTA ,
2 ) as a 
check for non-linearity in the relationship between the logarithm of the bank’s total assets and the 
bank’s efficiency; (iv) the lending quality, captured by the non-performing loans to loans ratio (
kiLQ , ), 
and finally, (v)  the off-balance-sheet activities over total assets (
kiOBSTA , ) to control for differences in 
the business mix. 
The vector of dummy variables ( iD ), in the efficiency equation (5) includes deregulation 
dummies to capture the changes in the regulatory environment and in particular the removal of 
restrictions on interstate banking and intrastate branching, which took place during the early part of our 
sample. Moreover, over the 26-years period covered by our sample two distinguishing crises took place, 
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namely the savings & loans associations crisis in the early period of our sample and the subprime 
mortgage and financial crisis in the late period of our sample. To capture the potential effects of these 
crisis we introduce the dummy iCRISES , which takes the value of 1 during the crises periods and 0 
otherwise.  
The set of ( iYEAR ) and ( iREGION ) dummy variables in equations (2a) and (2b) control, inter 
alia, for other macroeconomic, technological and regional changes in the economy. Table 3 reports the 
descriptive statistics for the variables employed in the model. The average cost efficiency scores are 
about 73%, thus suggesting that banks have considerable scope for reducing wasted inputs while at the 
same time increasing desirable output. 
 
 <Insert Table 3 about here> 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Results 
 
3.1. Cost efficiency levels 
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We measure the banks’ cost efficiency levels relative to a common frontier by pooling the data 
across states estimated separately for each year. This approach allows us to estimate efficiency 
differentials not only between commercial banks within a state but also across states using the same 
benchmark. The average estimated cost efficiencies relative to the whole sample are presented in Figure 
1. Table 4 also reports the bank efficiency levels averaged for the whole period for each state in the 
sample. 
 
<Insert Figure 1 and Table 4 about here> 
 
Since the DEA results show relatively high cost inefficiency (levels of about 27%)  there is still 
plenty of room for improvement in the way banks in the U.S. control their production costs (e.g. Berger 
and Mester, 1999). The mean efficiencies reported here are in accordance with previous studies in the 
U.S. area. In particular, cost efficiency scores display a decreasing trend between 1989 and 1993, 
possibly reflecting the major losses the U.S. banks have suffered due to the savings and loan associations 
(S&L) crisis. Following that, there is a peak in 2005 and then weakening over the following years. Overall, 
as it is apparent from figure 1, cost efficiency scores display a downward trend over the entire period 
considered.  
 
3.2. Freedom and cost efficiency            
In this second stage of the analysis, we look into the effects of economic and financial freedom 
on bank cost efficiency, while controlling for the effects of other relevant bank-specific and 
environmental factors. Following Papke and Wooldridge’s (1996) quasi-likelihood estimation method, 
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we estimate Equations (2a) and (2b) using a fractional logit process with robust standard errors. The 
results from equation (2a) are provided in Table 5.  
 
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
  
 The columns in Table 5 correspond to the results of different model specifications focusing on 
alternative economic freedom variables, while controlling for a selected set of relevant bank-specific 
variables frequently employed in banking studies. In particular, the first column in Table 5 reports the 
basic regression model that includes the credit market freedom variable and bank-specific control 
variables (model 1). The next five columns include alternative economic freedom control variables one 
at a time (models 2-6). To avoid problems of multicollinearity we include economic freedom variables 
one by one (models 1-6).  All components of the financial freedom indices appear to have a positive and 
statistically significant effect on bank efficiency. In terms of magnitude this effect is more pronounced 
when the "credit freedom" and "business freedom" are considered. The variable capturing assessments 
of "labor freedom" has a limited effect as expected since its potential impact on efficiency can is 
transmitted indirectly. Thus, the evidence from the exploratory analysis corresponding to specification 
(2a) suggests that constraints on business and labor, as reflected on these sub-components of the 
“regulation” counterpart of the freedom index, may result in an inefficient resource allocation process. 
In particular, the coefficients of iBUSINESS  and iLABOR  
are positive and statistically significant. This 
suggests that banks in states with less government bureaucracy, fewer difficulties in starting a new 
business, and fewer price controls and labor market restrictions tend to have higher cost efficiency 
levels. 
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 The results also document a strong link between bank efficiency and government size, property 
rights and freedom to trade internationally. Excessive government spending often leads to inefficiency, 
possibly through the channels of bureaucracy, waste, and lower productivity. Moreover, banks in states 
where the overall environment is conducive to the protection of the private sector property rights and 
the financial system is characterized by relatively high levels of openness tend to have higher efficiency 
levels. Put it differently, all coefficient estimates for the Fraser institute variables describing the state’s 
financial environment indicate a positive and statistically significant relationship at the 1% level. That is 
to say that economic freedom of different kinds is likely to have a favourable effect on cost efficiency 
possible because regulators and governments are engaged in more open policies, which in turn 
promotes the efficient allocation process resulting in a more efficient bank management. The findings 
are consistent with recent evidence from European data (Chortareas et al., 2013). 
Focusing on the relationship between cost efficiency and credit market freedom, we estimate 
equation (2b). The "credit" counterpart of the economic freedom indices is the component of the 
economic freedom indices most directly related index to bank performance. The credit market freedom 
( iCREDIT ) coefficient is positive at the 1% level of statistical significance in all model specifications. 
These results are broadly in line with recent empirical international evidence considering the 
implications of financial freedom indices (e.g., Chortareas et al., 2013) and/or liberalization and reforms 
in the financial sector (Barrell et al., 2015). 
Indeed, one would expect that a higher degree of restrictions and government controls in the 
financial and banking markets can have a significant role in reducing banks’ cost efficiency scores. Banks 
in states with more open credit markets may be more likely to engage in competitive policies, thus 
achieving higher levels of cost efficiencies.   
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<Insert Table 6 about here> 
 
 The specification of estimation of equation (2b) and the corresponding results shown in Table 6 
take explicitly into account the deregulation and crises indicators. In particular, we consider the credit 
market freedom, our proxy of financial and banking freedom, along with an index of interstate banking 
deregulation index (
iINTER ) and an intrastate branching deregulation index ( iINTRA ) based on the 
dates presented in Appendix A.1 (columns 1-2). The results of a specification that considers the S&L as 
well as the recent financial crisis appear in column 3. Finally, in column 4 we report results from a 
specification that consider all deregulation and crises indicators. The results broadly corroborate the key 
findings of the baseline model (equation 2a) in Table 5. The credit market freedom ( iCREDIT ) 
coefficient remains positive at the 1% level of statistical significance in all models tested, suggesting that 
more deregulated systems are conducive to the more efficient operations of financial institutions. Both 
interstate and intrastate deregulation that took place in the 80s and 90s have a positive effect on the 
efficiency of financial institutions across U.S. states. Clearly the occurrences of crises in the financial 
industry impact negative on the efficient operation of banks.  
Turning to the bank-specific control variables which appear in all specifications (Tables 5 and 6), 
we find that the equity over total assets ratio (
kiEQAS , ) variable has a significantly positive sign 
suggesting that higher capital ratios are associated with more efficient bank operations. This finding is 
consistent with the argument that higher capitalization contributes to alleviating agency problems 
between managers and shareholders (Mester, 1996). As in most cases efficiency is positively related to 
bank size, which in our models is manifested by a positive and statistically significant sign for the 
coefficient of the quadratic term of ( kiLNTA , ), implying a non-linear relationship between bank size 
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and efficiency. This finding is also consistent with the results of previous studies (Stavarek, 2004; 
Altunbas et al., 2007). The exposure to OBS activities is negatively related to cost efficiency suggesting 
that banks which are more focused on non-traditional banking business are on average less efficient. 
Finally, the lending quality variable display a positive relationship with bank efficiency but this link is 
weak since the relevant coefficient is not statistically significant. 
 Overall, it appears that economic freedom is a key element of the environment within which 
financial institutions operate. More credit market freedom seems to be associated with higher cost 
efficiency scores in U.S. banking. Furthermore, when controlling for deregulation our results reveal a 
strong link between the states deregulation and bank cost efficiency.  
 
4. Conclusions  
This paper contributes to the existing literature by focusing on the relationship between the 
credit market freedom counterparts of the economic freedom indices and bank cost efficiency across 
the U.S. states. Our analysis covers an exceptionally lengthy period as compared to the typical sample 
dimensions used in bank efficiency studies and covers periods characterized by different degrees of 
financial regulation intensity. The credit market freedom index proxies the tightness of the regulatory 
environment. Moreover, we consider the effects of other relevant dimension of economic freedom, as 
measured by the Fraser Institute, on the cost efficiency of financial institutions. Such measures include 
business freedom, labor market freedom, and proxies for the legal system and property rights. That is, 
we test the hypothesis that a higher degree of “market friendliness” and greater independence in 
financial markets from government control allow banks to perform in a more efficient manner. After 
producing DEA cost efficiency scores for banks operating in 48 U.S. states between 1987 and 2012 
(99,032 observations), we use a robust fractional logit estimator procedure to account for the effects of 
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the economic freedom indices on the cost efficiency scores, while controlling for bank specific 
characteristics and deregulation indicators. In addition, we control for effects of the S&L crisis and the 
global financial crisis. The evidence produced show that a clear positive association between the credit 
market counterparts of the economic freedom indices and the bank cost efficiency measures exist. This 
suggests that excessive government interference in the financial institutions activities may adversely 
affect the efficient operation of banks.  
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Figure 1  
Cost efficiency estimates for U.S. commercial banks 
Bank balance sheet and income statement data are from  
Consolidated Reports of Conditions and Income ("Call Reports"). 
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Table 1  
Time and size distribution of banks included in the estimation of the efficiency frontier 
Bank balance sheet and income statement data are from Consolidated Reports of Conditions and Income ("Call Reports"). 
Asset size values are expressed in terms of thousands of dollars. 
  
  USA 
  Number  Asset size 
Year   of obs. Mean St.Dev. Minimum Maximum 
1987  3,708 103,818 842,272 2,365 41,362,913 
1988  3,726 109,725 891,279 2,061 43,732,080 
1989  3,728 114,760 890,699 2,158 45,555,858 
1990  3,716 126,967 1,029,863 2,175 53,823,569 
1991  3,785 155,100 1,279,200 2,111 51,747,459 
1992  3,749 165,250 1,345,911 2,270 50,833,179 
1993  3,750 160,469 1,234,237 2,164 50,924,650 
1994  3,750 171,061 1,314,150 1,924 52,215,794 
1995  3,756 157,816 1,150,814 2,523 49,091,757 
1996  3,728 208,725 2,117,564 2,374 99,165,167 
1997  3,712 248,234 2,439,246 2,045 89,155,929 
1998  3,725 327,402 5,558,105 1,972 317,127,000 
1999  3,736 430,412 9,660,782 2,306 571,732,000 
2000  3,688 590,652 11,940,707 2,333 584,284,000 
2001  3,666 685,775 12,605,433 2,497 551,691,000 
2002  3,686 776,198 13,469,504 2,488 565,382,000 
2003  3,698 866,629 15,251,193 3,209 617,962,335 
2004  3,708 989,570 18,676,842 3,152 771,618,758 
2005  3,704 1,146,496 22,910,650 4,905 1,082,250,290 
2006  3,731 1,313,308 27,235,048 4,523 1,196,123,794 
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2007  3,764 1,164,282 22,819,241 4,484 1,251,715,000 
2008  3,768 1,629,478 33,240,075 3,063 1,470,276,918 
2009  3,747 1,065,664 20,520,737 4,541 1,161,361,000 
2010  3,746 1,465,334 27,533,225 4,592 1,154,293,000 
2011  4,985 1,681,284 33,269,349 4,001 1,459,157,302 
2012  4,572 496,578 2,147,294 3,533 85,810,000 
Average   3,809 - - - - 
Total   99,032         
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Table 2  
Descriptive statistics of bank inputs and outputs (state averages 1987-2012) included in the estimation of the 
efficiency frontier 
Bank balance sheet and income statement data are from Consolidated Reports of Conditions and Income ("Call 
Reports"). All values are expressed in terms of thousands of dollars. 
  
State 
Consumer 
Loans  
Business 
Loans 
Securities  Labor 
Physical 
Capital  
Total 
Deposits  
Labor 
Prices  
Physical 
Capital 
Prices  
Total 
Deposits 
Prices  
1987 11,469 40,933 49,812 60.55 1,604 87,793 24.19 0.42 0.05 
1988 11,879 45,057 51,195 60.51 1,610 92,875 25.22 0.42 0.05 
1989 12,722 48,682 51,631 61.43 1,737 97,539 26.36 0.42 0.06 
1990 13,572 55,794 55,700 65.01 1,919 107,215 27.51 0.40 0.06 
1991 14,706 66,439 71,598 73.95 2,357 129,298 29.11 0.40 0.05 
1992 15,465 69,532 77,742 77.95 2,531 137,065 30.17 0.40 0.04 
1993 15,987 67,927 74,048 75.29 2,520 131,482 31.37 0.38 0.03 
1994 18,045 75,369 74,947 78.05 2,708 137,616 32.25 0.39 0.03 
1995 15,127 70,369 69,769 72.87 2,569 129,850 33.41 0.38 0.04 
1996 20,807 94,284 90,172 88.71 3,489 165,442 34.51 0.38 0.04 
1997 25,433 117,722 101,053 99.53 4,058 192,154 35.64 0.38 0.04 
1998 27,420 150,174 144,819 119.79 5,043 239,316 36.88 0.36 0.04 
1999 31,129 217,074 175,924 146.14 6,362 310,956 38.48 0.35 0.04 
2000 48,721 284,062 249,880 180.87 8,106 428,849 39.95 0.33 0.04 
2001 56,647 318,335 302,051 199.85 8,742 490,193 41.54 0.32 0.04 
2002 72,874 360,423 333,593 216.98 9,464 550,921 43.58 0.32 0.02 
2003 85,773 386,562 384,404 227.65 10,062 614,954 45.54 0.33 0.02 
2004 92,690 440,105 446,136 251.37 10,838 706,431 47.16 0.32 0.02 
2005 92,420 523,596 518,593 271.44 12,123 814,704 48.81 0.31 0.02 
2006 94,079 640,326 565,620 286.05 13,549 923,068 50.63 0.31 0.03 
2007 98,665 574,079 478,867 256.24 13,106 803,430 52.43 0.32 0.03 
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2008 112,956 756,261 744,432 299.08 16,509 1,100,174 54.31 0.34 0.02 
2009 74,836 504,147 473,938 211.64 12,932 786,822 55.57 0.33 0.02 
2010 97,802 669,264 682,859 292.78 16,014 1,108,861 57.15 0.33 0.01 
2011 173,882 730,315 759,976 299.33 17,376 1,260,383 60.50 0.35 0.01 
2012 29,756 245,580 178,157 100.40 7,762 371,959 65.09 0.39 0.01 
Total 1,364,860 7,552,411 7,206,915 4,173 195,088 11,919,349 1,067 9.37 0.85 
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Table 3 
Variables Names, Definitions, Summary Statistics and Sources for 1987-2012 
Statistics are calculated over 48 states over 1987-2012. 
Variables Definition Mean St.Dev. Median Source 
      
Efficiency measure:      
EFF Cost Efficiency 0.73 0.11 0.73 
Bank balance sheets and 
income statements. "Call 
Reports" from the 
Federal Reserve Board. 
Authors' calculations. 
     
Economic freedom variables:      
CREDIT Credit market freedom 9.07 0.91 9.50 
Economic freedom of 
North America. Fraser 
Institute. 
BUSINESS Business freedom 7.49 0.52 7.90 
LABOR Labor market freedom 6.53 0.83 6.60 
SIZE Size of government 6.98 0.92 7.10 
PROPERTY 
Legal system and 
property rights 
8.06 0.65 8.30 
TRADE 
Freedom to trade 
internationally  
8.45 0.41 8.70 
      
Bank specific control variables:      
EQAS 
Total equity/total 
assets 
0.10 0.03 0.10  
LNTA 
Logarithm of total 
assets 
11.35 1.23 11.23  
LQ 
Non-performing 
loans/total loans 
0.01 0.02 0.01  
OBSTA 
Off-balance-sheet/total 
assets 
0.01 0.01 0.01  
      
Deregulation and crises indicators (0/1) 
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INTER 
Interstate banking 
deregulation (switches 
on after deregulation) 
0.96 0.19 1.00 
Dates in Appendix A. 
(Table A.1). Authors' 
calculations. 
INTRA 
Intrastate  branching 
deregulation (switches 
on after deregulation) 
0.95 0.22 1.00 
CRISES (switches on after S&L 
and the recent financial 
crises) 
0.25 0.43 0.00 Authors' calculations. 
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Table 4 
Cost efficiency estimates 
Statistics are calculated over 48 states over 1987-2012. 
States Mean St.Dev. Median 
Alabama 0.733 0.118 0.738 
Alaska 0.703 0.154 0.674 
Arkansas 0.708 0.107 0.709 
California 0.766 0.139 0.750 
Colorado 0.699 0.108 0.699 
Connecticut 0.725 0.115 0.732 
Delaware 0.798 0.146 0.799 
Florida 0.720 0.124 0.717 
Georgia 0.716 0.107 0.719 
Hawaii 0.806 0.116 0.819 
Idaho 0.681 0.098 0.699 
Illinois 0.728 0.107 0.730 
Indiana 0.737 0.109 0.741 
Iowa 0.736 0.104 0.734 
Kansas 0.745 0.109 0.746 
Kentucky 0.739 0.109 0.746 
Louisiana 0.691 0.105 0.692 
Maine 0.770 0.140 0.785 
Maryland 0.756 0.115 0.754 
Massachusetts 0.710 0.138 0.711 
Michigan 0.722 0.114 0.729 
Minnesota 0.730 0.101 0.730 
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Mississippi 0.716 0.102 0.723 
Missouri 0.721 0.109 0.722 
Montana 0.723 0.100 0.722 
Nebraska 0.764 0.112 0.765 
Nevada 0.714 0.138 0.686 
New Hampshire 0.717 0.153 0.707 
New Jersey 0.717 0.128 0.694 
New Mexico 0.692 0.110 0.690 
New York 0.737 0.125 0.727 
North Carolina 0.740 0.123 0.739 
North Dakota 0.723 0.099 0.728 
Ohio 0.754 0.121 0.751 
Oklahoma 0.720 0.109 0.721 
Oregon 0.705 0.118 0.712 
Pennsylvania 0.748 0.112 0.753 
South Carolina 0.713 0.102 0.712 
South Dakota 0.741 0.107 0.736 
Tennessee 0.714 0.113 0.715 
Texas 0.709 0.108 0.709 
Utah 0.732 0.131 0.725 
Vermont 0.735 0.126 0.739 
Virginia 0.737 0.114 0.741 
Washington 0.708 0.119 0.710 
West Virginia 0.735 0.119 0.734 
Wisconsin 0.741 0.110 0.741 
Wyoming 0.699 0.113 0.688 
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Table 5 
QMLE analysis using equation (1a) 
48 states over 1987-2012 
Dep.Var.: EFF (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Economic freedom variables             
CREDIT 0.306*** - - - - - 
  (0.028)           
BUSINESS - 0.451*** - - - - 
    (0.052)         
LABOR - - 0.009** - - - 
      (0.003)       
SIZE - - - 0.010*** - - 
        (0.002)     
PROPERTY  - - - - 0.404*** - 
          (0.042)   
TRADE - - - - - 0.830*** 
            (0.061) 
              
Bank Specific variables             
EQAS 4.563*** 4.537*** 4.528*** 4.530*** 4.536*** 4.544*** 
  (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
LnTA -1.644*** -1.643*** -1.645*** -1.643*** -1.644*** -1.164*** 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
LnTA² 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.071*** 0.070*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
LQ 0.135 0.115 0.132 0.120 0.126 0.122 
  (0.137) (0.138) (0.137) (0.138) (0.137) (0.137) 
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OBSTA -0.250 -0.250 -0.269 -0.267 -0.252 -0.245 
  (0.364) (0.365) (0.365) (0.365) (0.365) (0.365) 
Constant 7.302*** 6.629*** 10.114*** 10.093*** 6.844*** 2.877*** 
  (0.294) (0.430) (0.124) (0.124) (0.367) (0.559) 
              
YEAR YES YES YES YES YES YES 
REGION YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 99032 99032 99032 99032 99032 99032 
Note: CREDIT= Credit market regulation, BUSINESS= Business regulations, LABOR= Labor market regulation, 
SIZE= Size of government, PROPERTY= Legal system and property rights, TRADE= Freedom to trade 
internationally, EQAS= Equity/Assets, LnTA= Logarithm of Total Assets; LnTA² = Quadratic term of Total Assets, 
LQ= Non-performing loans/Total loans, OBSTA= Off balance sheet items/total assets, Constant= constant 
term.   
Estimated using Papke and Wooldridge (1996) Quasi-Likelihood estimation method.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. P-Values are derived using robust standard errors 
*Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%.   
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Table 6 
QMLE analysis using equation (1b) 
48 states over 1987-2012 
Dep.Var.: EFF (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Economic freedom variables         
CREDIT 0.729*** 0.822*** 0.429*** 0.429*** 
  (0.009) (0.103) (0.007) (0.007) 
          
Bank Specific variables         
EQAS 4.547*** 4.546*** 4.546*** 4.548*** 
  (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
LnTA -1.645*** -1.643*** -1.642*** -1.645*** 
  (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
LnTA² 0.070*** 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.071*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
LQ 0.132 0.095 0.122 0.113 
  (0.137) (0.139) (0.137) (0.138) 
OBSTA -0.247 -0.233 -0.244 -0.237 
  (0.364) (0.365) (0.364) (0.365) 
          
Deregulator variables         
INTER 0.017** - - 0.035*** 
  (0.008)     (0.008) 
INTRA - 0.059*** - 0.066*** 
    (0.007)   (0.007) 
CRISES - - -0.359*** -0.406*** 
      (0.013) (0.010) 
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Constant 2.612*** 2.325*** 6.069*** 6.044*** 
  (0.156) (0.160) (0.139) (0.139) 
          
YEAR YES YES YES YES 
REGION YES YES YES YES 
Observations 99032 99032 99032 99032 
Note: CREDIT= Credit market regulation, INTER= Interstate banking deregulation, INTRA= Intrastate branching 
deregulation, CRISES= S&L and Financial crises, EQAS= Equity/Assets, LnTA= Logarithm of Total Assets; LnTA² = 
Quadratic term of Total Assets, LQ= Non-performing loans/Total loans, OBSTA= Off balance sheet items/total 
assets, Constant= constant term.   
Estimated using Papke and Wooldridge (1996) Quasi-Likelihood estimation method.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. P-Values are derived using robust standard errors 
*Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%. 
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Appendix A: 
Table A.1 
States, by the year out-of-state bank entry and intrastate branching permitted 
States 
Interstate 
Banking 
Intrastate 
Branching 
Alabama 1987 1981 
Alaska  1982 * 
Arizona 1986 * 
Arkansas 1989 1994 
California 1987 * 
Colorado 1988 1991 
Connecticut 1983 1980 
District of Columbia 1985 * 
Delaware 1988 * 
Florida 1985 1988 
Georgia 1985 1983 
Hawaii 1999 1986 
Idaho 1985 * 
Illinois 1986 1988 
Indiana 1986 1989 
Iowa 1991 * 
Kansas 1992 1987 
Kentucky 1984 1990 
Louisiana 1987 1988 
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Maine 1978 1975 
Maryland 1985 * 
Massachusetts 1983 1984 
Michigan 1986 1987 
Minnesota 1986 1993 
Mississippi 1988 1986 
Missouri 1986 1990 
Montana 1993 1990 
Nebraska 1990 1985 
Nevada 1985 * 
New Hampshire 1987 1987 
New Jersey 1986 1977 
New Mexico 1989 1991 
New York 1982 1976 
North Carolina 1985 * 
North Dakota 1991 1987 
Ohio 1985 1979 
Oklahoma 1987 1988 
Oregon 1986 1985 
Pennsylvania 1986 1982 
Rhode Island 1984 * 
South Carolina 1986 * 
South Dakota 1988 * 
Tennessee 1985 1985 
Texas 1987 1988 
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Utah 1984 1981 
Vermont 1988 1970 
Virginia 1985 1978 
Washington 1987 1985 
West Virginia 1988 1987 
Wisconsin 1987 1990 
Wyoming 1987 1988 
Branching date reflects when states permitted branching via merger and acquisition 
(usually before de novo branching permitted).  
Source: Morgan et al. (2004) and updates by authors. 
*pre-1970    
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Table A.2 
Regions 
Regions States  
New England  Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Vermont 
Middle Atlantic  New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania 
South Atlantic 
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia 
East South Central  Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Tennessee 
West South Central Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas 
East North Central  Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin 
West North Central 
Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and 
South Dakota 
Mountain 
Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and 
Wyoming 
Pacific Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington 
Source: Clark (1997) and updates by authors. 
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Appendix B: 
 
Table B.1 
Details on the Economic Freedom variables included in the empirical analysis 
Variable Category Description 
CREDIT Credit market freedom 
This variable takes values between 0 and 10, with 
higher values indicating greater independence in 
financial and banking markets from government 
control. This includes ownership of banks (percentage 
of deposits held in privately owned banks), 
competition (the extent to which domestic banks face 
competition from foreign banks), extension of credit 
(percentage of credit extended to the private sector), 
and presence of interest rate controls. A score of 10 
indicates repressive government interference, 
whereas a score of 0 a negligible one.  
  
  
  
  
  
  
       
BUSINESS Business freedom This is a quantitative measure of the ability to start 
and operate a new business that represents the 
overall burden of bureaucracy as well as the efficiency 
of government in the regulatory process. This variable 
includes price controls, administrative conditions for 
new businesses, government bureaucracy, difficulties 
in starting a new business, irregular, additional 
payments connected with import and export permits, 
business licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, 
police protection, or loan applications. The business 
freedom score ranges between 0 and 10, with 10 
equalling the freest business environment. 
    
    
    
    
    
    
       
LABOR Labor market freedom 
This variable measures the extent to which labour 
market rigidities are present. It considers the impact 
of minimum wage regulation, the government 
employment as a percentage of total state 
employment, and the ability to form and join unions 
and its relation to public policy. This variable takes 
values between 0 and 10, with higher values 
indicating a freer labor market. 
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SIZE Size of government 
This variable indicates the extent to which states rely 
on the political process to allocate resources, goods 
and services. When government spending increases 
relative to spending to individuals, households and 
businesses, government decision-making is 
substituted for personal choice and economic 
freedom is reduced. This variable is constructed using 
the following areas: General consumption 
expenditures by government as a percentage of GDP; 
Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP; Social 
security payments as a percentage of GDP; and 
Government enterprises and investment. Higher 
values indicate excessive government spending. 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
              
PROPERTY 
Legal system and 
property rights  
This variable measures the ability of individuals to 
accumulate private property, secured by clear laws 
that are fully enforced by the state. It considers the 
following components: Judicial independence; 
Impartial courts; Protection of property rights; 
Military interference in rule of law and politics; 
Integrity of the legal system; Legal enforcement of 
contracts; Regulatory restrictions on the sale of real 
property; Reliability of police; and Business costs of 
crime. This variable takes values between 0 and 10, 
with higher values indicating more certain legal 
protection of property. 
  
    
    
    
    
    
              
TRADE 
Freedom to trade 
internationally This variable takes values between 0 and 10 with 
higher values indicating low tariffs, less regulatory 
trade barriers, few controls on the movement of 
capital and people and efficient administration of 
customs. This variable is constructed using the 
following areas: Tariffs; Regulatory trade barriers; 
Black-market exchange rates; and Controls of the 
movement of capital and people.  
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Highlights 
►We investigate the relationship between market freedom and bank efficiency. ►We estimate 
cost efficiency scores using the Data Envelopment Analysis. ►We develop a fractional 
regression model to test our hypotheses. ►Strong link between credit market freedom and cost 
efficiency. ►Freer market systems can improve efficiency levels for US states. 
